I have recently authored a full-length report about British-Turkish relations. Not to give too much away, I argue that although both British and Turkish politicians call bilateral ties a “strategic partnership”, in reality there is little that is strategic about the relationship. The report is due to be released in a couple of weeks so please watch this space.
However, let me address an aspect of British-Turkish relations which I allude to in my report, a factor for why there are closer ties between Britain and Turkey: Britain is not Germany! Allow me to explain what I mean.
After Germany, Britain is Turkey’s largest trading partner in Europe. Like Germany, Britain excels in the automotive, pharmaceutical, chemicals and arms industries. And just like Germany, Britain is a significant world economic power and there are thousands of UK companies which operate in Turkey and is an important source of foreign investment.
However, unlike Germany Britain does not link relations with Turkey with human rights or democratization (or even pay lip service to such lofty ideals). British policy makers prefer to voice concern about Turkey’s decent to authoritarianism, lack of freedom of expression and the erosion of checks and balances in private. Unlike their German counterparts, British officials seldom criticise Turkish policies or actions in public. This works for the Turkish government which is tired about hearing such criticism.
In contrast to Germany, Britain does not have a strong of a presence of members of the Gulen movement or the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). This is important because the Turkish government considers followers of Fetullah Gulen, the Turkish preacher in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania and accused of masterminding the July 2016 attempted coup, an existential challenge. The Turkish government remains in an all-out war against the movement and not only seeks to purge them within Turkish state organs and eradicate their presence in civil society, but Ankara also seeks the extradition of leading members who reside or fled abroad. This means their activities in Germany is a significant source of tension.
Similarly, the PKK which has waged an on and off separatist war against the Turkish state since the 1980s is considered by Ankara a significant challenge to the Turkish Republic. The current Turkish government is in no mood to negotiate with even moderate Kurds as evidenced by the arrests of members of the largely peaceful parliamentary Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Both the Gulen movement and the PKK activities in the UK, although present, are far less prolific than in Germany. Sure, there was a recent extradition request against a Gulen member which a British court rejected, but overall this is small fry compared to other European countries. In other words, while Turkey is seething because Germany’s insistence on due process and fairness when it comes to PKK and Gulenist activities, Britain gives Turkey much less cause for anger.
Britain is also different from Germany because of the make-up of citizens of Turkish origin. The British-Turkish population stands at around 500,000 which is certainly not an insignificant number. However, this is nowhere near the size of their German counterparts where the population of Turkish origin Germans is about 4 million or 5% of the total population. Unlike Germany two-thirds of British Turks are from Cyprus rather than Turkey proper. This is an important distinction because the Mediterranean island was a protectorate of the British Empire and then a crown colony for much of the previous century. This meant that the population who migrated to the UK were familiar with British customs and practices.
Although not perfect, the integration process of Turks in Britain was comparatively easier than Germany for numerous reasons that many scholars have already addressed. Also, the other Turks who migrated to the UK came during different periods. Some were intellectuals who fled the 1980 coup, others were Kurds seeking a better life away from the conflict in the Southeast. Others were students at British universities or businesspersons with a financial stake in Britain’s future prosperity.
So, when Turkish politicians such as President Erdogan say that Turks abroad should not assimilate and see Turks outside of Turkey as part of their jurisdiction, it strikes a chord with Berlin, but doesn’t have anywhere near the same impact in London.
However, the fact that Britain is not Germany is, as my report argues, not enough to cement a strategic partnership between Britain and Turkey. In fact, it is a weak basis for relations to develop into anything significant. Germany’s relations with Turkey has more depth, meaning and engages broader segments of Turkish society. In the long-term this will be beneficial to Germany as its relations with Turkey is one which is not just with the governing party.
In a relatively recent post I commented that Iran and UNRWA were the two foreign policy positions that US President Donald J. Trump managed to get right. However, I have come to change my opinion slightly. When it comes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees President Trump only gets half a point.
President Trump was absolutely right to label UNRWA a deeply flawed operation highlighting the damage it does to Palestinian school children by indoctrinating them about the so-called right of return and the way it counts the numbers of Palestinian refugees. He was also well within his rights, and even correct, to cut off US$364 million worth of US aid to the defective UN agency. However, Trump only gets half a point because the move was completely devoid of leadership (a subject I will return to in a future post). Having correctly identified UNRWA’s flaws, Trump did not lead an international campaign for others to follow America’s lead. Trump did not offer a new direction about how to either reform UNRWA or finance alternative operations more conducive to peace. He might as well have used the words of South Park’s Eric Cartman: “screw you guys, I’m going home!” But this turns me to the real issue I want to address which is the opportunity that European countries are missing to change and reform UNRWA.
Following the loss of US finance, Germany, the UK, and the supranational European Union are now UNRWA’s top donors. Instead of using this opportunity to open a debate about the future of UNRWA, or at the very minimum make funding conditional on reform, European countries and the EU simply stated their intensions to increase their donations. It was as if Europe (and Canada) was making a knee jerk reaction to do the opposite of Trump, ignoring the fact that on this position Trump was right because UNRWA is indeed a mismanaged and over financed body whose functions serve as an obstacle to peace.
Europe’s decision to increase funding is a crucial mistake for several reasons. First, Europe has missed yet another opportunity to show leadership on the international stage. With the US funding cut, Europe –the EU and individual European states – now have greater influence over UNRWA which is now highly dependent on European support. This has the potential to translate into significant leverage over the future direction and current activities of UNRWA. Alas, by declaring that Europe will increase UNRWA funding squanders the opportunity.
Second, Europe is ignoring UNRWA’s continued outrages. Over the years there have been cases of Hamas or other militant groups storing rockets or weapons at UNRWA schools and the hosting of informal summer camps on UNRWA property where violence and extremism was taught. There have been cases of incitement (in person and online) and there are question marks about UNRWA’s transparency when it comes to funding and financial oversight. To make matters worse Hamas has overwhelming representation in UNRWA’s unions. And I haven’t even touched on the subject of UNRWA school alumni who have gone on to involve themselves in terrorism. Surely, it’s a no brainer that at an absolute minimum the EU, Germany and the UK should demand verifiable guarantees that European taxpayers’ money will not ever be used for nefarious purposes.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, Europe’s continued funding of UNRWA contradicts the very tenets of the two-state solution, the policy of not only the EU as a member of the Quartet, the international body that also comprises of the US, UN and Russia, but also the official positions of European nation-states themselves, Britain and Germany the two largest nation-state donors of UNRWA. However, UNRWA openly advocates and campaigns for the implementation of the so-called Palestinian right of return, including the descendants of the 700,000 original refugees now entering their fifth generation. In other words, UNRWA works towards the influx of millions of Palestinians into Israel which would lead to the extermination of the Jewish state through an overwhelming demographic imbalance.
This defeat of Israel through the Palestinian right or return is a position that mirrors that of Hamas. Just since March 2018, Hamas has organised weekly violent and provocative “return” marches by the Israel-Gaza border. Far from peaceful, these demonstrations, which are often met by lethal force by the Israel Defence Force, seek to sabotage and infiltrate the border in order to kill Israeli citizens. Meanwhile militants lob enflamed kites into Israel in the hope that they start wildfires and kill people. This violence is then given a voice of respectability through UNRWA, a UN body no less, whose spokespersons condemn Israeli actions while emphasising the Palestinian so-called right of return and indoctrinate children to never let go of this so-called “right” thus perpetuating the conflict.
The fact that Europe continues to unconditionally support UNRWA despite its advocacy for the so-called right of return which is anti-peace, sympathetic to Hamas and contrary to the two-state solution is, quite frankly, unacceptable. European nations, especially Germany and Britain, should at the very minimum demand conditions before they agree to any additional UNRWA funding. The conditions should include:
These conditions should be the very minimum if Europe insists that it continue to fund UNRWA. It should be demanded that the organisation become a body that is conducive to peace rather than the perpetuation of violence.
There are many embattled democracies in the world today, but How Democracy Die is primarily a book about America. It is a warning to Americans to never be complacent about their democracy, regardless of how robust and dynamic the oldest democratic constitution in the world may appear to be; the foundations of even the strongest of constitutions shake when an autocratic demagogue is committed to smashing the liberal democratic order.
In this book, Harvard professors Daniel Ziblatt and Steven Levitsky examine international examples to illustrate how autocrats use legal means to kill democracy. Professor Ziblatt is a historian of Europe from the nineteenth century to the present day and Professor Levitsky focuses on Latin America and the developing world. You can’t get more qualified than that to write a book about how democracies die.
With the exception of its snowy neighbour to the north and its transatlantic Anglo sidekick, many who live outside of the US reside in countries where democracy has either died and been reborn, or is experiencing a difficult process of democratization. Others are witnessing the death of their own democracy in front of their very eyes. It is therefore imperative that Americans, regardless of their level of education, political views or social status, pay heed to the political histories of other nations in order to prevent the misfortune of others to be repeated in America. This is especially true while Donald Trump sits in the Oval Office. Sure, he was elected fair and square, but there are facets of his character and policies that raise alarm bells.
Borrowing and updating the work of Juan Linz, Ziblatt and Levitsky highlight four key indicators of authoritarianism. They are 1) rejection or weak commitment to the democratic rules of the game, 2) denial of the legitimacy of political opponents, 3) toleration of encouragement of violence, 4) readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents including the media. Note that Trump falls into each of these four categories.
In recent times the death of a democracy is less likely to occur through a military coup or by a violent revolution. It’s not that there aren’t any good old-fashioned military coups anymore (Thailand, Ecuador), but it is increasingly the case that demagogues obtain power through the ballot box, and once there slowly but surely push democratic norms to the point of collapse in a bid to solidify power. Often this achieved by eroding the checks and balances needed in a healthy democracy through the combination of nullifying the legislative power of parliament, filling the judiciary with sycophantic or co-opted judges, attacking the critical media and delegitimising political opponents. Such has happened in Venezuela, Turkey, Peru, Argentina, Russia, and Hungary to name but a few. Then there is, of course, the examples of Germany and Italy earlier in the century. In the case of the United States, Ziblatt and Levitsky argue that over time America’s democratic fail safes have been eroded including party gatekeeping, institutional forbearance, self-restraint and mutual toleration. This has led to the situation of today. A US president who has no qualms about railing against the free press and calling for his political opponent to be locked up.
It is often said that history is doomed to repeat itself. Perhaps that’s true for those who choose to ignore the past. This is why a book like this is so important. Americans can no longer afford to be complacent.
While Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was visiting the United Kingdom last week, I wrote a piece about UK-Turkish relations which was published by the EU Observer and can be found here. Some of you might be aware that I am currently working on a research project about UK-Turkish relations at the Istanbul Policy Center. My main thinking about the subject will be available in a full policy report in a couple of months, but let me take this occasion to make a few brief comments about President Erdogan’s UK visit.
In my view UK-Turkish relations are entering a golden age. Bilateral trade is flowing at its highest level, ministers are regularly meeting and goodwill has never been higher. So, it was pretty obvious that Downing Street would give President Erdogan the red-carpet treatment including the pleasure of meeting Her Royal Majesty the Queen.
Indeed, it was this audience with Britain’s hereditary sovereign which was the most controversial aspect of President Erdogan’s visit. It should be remembered that as soon as Erdogan called snap elections other European nations ruled out the possibility of ministerial visits for campaign purposes, leaving only Bosnia as part of Erdogan’s international campaigning.
But President Erdogan’s visit to London was planned well before the snap elections were announced. However, it was not planned as a state visit, meaning that London was not obliged to stick the baked bean (that’s cockney for Queen) before the Turkish head of state. However, Lizzy was not busy and so London was able to provide Erdogan a great photo op while he is fights what is increasingly becoming a tough presidential and parliamentary election race next month.
But it didn’t quite work out so smoothly, at least not for Erdogan. The footage of the meeting between Erdogan and the Queen was not heavily circulated by the Turkish press, even pro-government outlets. Perhaps this was because Erdogan appeared to be making a very low bow before the Queen in the photograph? Obviously, one is supposed to make a humble nod of the head before blue blood, but it remains the case that at 1.85 (6ft 1) Erdogan towers over Elizabeth II whose height stands at a regal 1.63 (5ft 4). In other words, in order to make eye contact and shake the hand of the head of the House of Windsor, President Erdogan had little choice but to make a deeper bow than what looked good.
A slightly different case with the Turkish first lady Emine who was accompanying her husband in his royal visit. Looking rather overwhelmed by the pomp and circumstance of the ceremony, Emine had the advantage of being about the same height as her regnant host, and their handshake looked like one between equals. This was the photo the Turkish press chose to publicise more widely.
Also, Erdogan made a disastrous interview with Bloomberg while in London, stating that he would tighten his grip on the economy including ensuring that interest rates remain low. This was the opposite of what investors wanted to hear and contributed to the Lira plunging against all major currencies including the dollar, euro and pound sterling. The visit can hardly be described as a boon before the elections.
This aside, there are questions that need to be raised about this visit. Last year the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee released a report on the UK’s relations with Turkey which stressed the importance of not just strengthen its relationship with the ruling governing party but all segments of Turkish society. Absolutely right. But upgrading the nature of Erdogan’s visit to London hardly meets this goal, especially without the UK making some kind of gesture towards the opposition or fostering stronger ties with Turkish civil society. The question still looms, how can Britain forge ties with all segments of Turkish society without angering the governing party and President? For real long-term durability in bilateral relations, Britain has to diversify the nature of its engagement with Turkey.
However, from Turkey’s perspective, this recent visit affirmed what I have thought all along - in Britain, Erdogan and the AKP has found a perfect ally. Although Britain’s international standing has diminished, it still remains a significant medium international power that is able to punch slightly above its weight. Turkey’s ties with the UK are unlike that of, say, Germany. British leaders do not go on about human rights, the state of democracy or the rule of law. They mention it a little bit of course, but they in no way make political relations and economic engagement contingent on such matters. Also, as a supporter of Turkey’s EU accession and a country that has been the most sympathetic towards the ruling government after the attempted 2016 coup, Britain has earned Erdogan’s favour. Last week, British Prime Minister Theresa May even used the term “Kurdish Terrorism”. You don't hear that too often from European leaders.
The UK is eager to shake hands and make deals whether that be in the defence, services and pharmaceutical sectors or new emerging industries. London's hope is that during the period of Brexit, UK-Turkish relations can stand as an example of beneficial trade and diplomatic relations with other countries outside of the EU and thus maintain the Global Britain brand.
Much more to come about this subject in a couple of months when my report is released.
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